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InstItutIonal ProPertIes  
of the south east euroPean regIon1
This paper will identify and analyze the basic institutional characteristics of the region of South East 
Europe (SEE6), because the building of institutions is one of the main conditions for sustainable develop-
ment. Basic theoretical and practical barriers, that crucially influenced the current unfavorable transitional 
institutional characteristics in SEE6, will be researched in a selective way. The aim of this paper is to demon-
strate the essential institutional differences of this region in comparison with developed countries, particu-
larly in terms of real institutional change, the application of institutional pluralism and the main institu-
tional barriers. The paper starts from the hypothesis that ignoring the institutional pluralism and domina-
tion of alternative institutions in SEE6 led to dysfunctionality of institutional change, which had a negative 
impact on all indicators of economic development in the surveyed countries. The emphasis is on the factors of 
monistic anti-institutional action, from which the alternative institutions stand out for their destructive sig-
nificance. It points to devastating and anti-developmental consequences of their actions, and their theoret-
ical support of neoliberal type, which is in practice vulgarized and converted into a quasi-neoliberalism. It 
identifies the real and concrete causes of reproduced institutional vacuum. The findings from the study sug-
gest that countries of the SEE6 region should apply civilization-proven development models of institutional 
pluralism type. This indicates the importance of taking real institutional changes and urgent overcoming the 
quasi-institutional forms in order to successfully valorize the economic resources in the countries of SEE6.
Keywords: institutional pluralism, institucional changes, alternative institutions, region of South East Europe
1. Introduction
During the period of the post-socialistic tran-
sition in the countries of the SEE6 region, a whole 
system of inhibiting factors have been operating 
(formal, informal, and alternative), causing the 
formation of conglomerate system disfunction-
ality. This have had a synergetic, destructive, and 
braking character, and led to the "coordination 
1 © Draskovic M., Grgurevic N., Delibasic M. Text. 2015.
failures" [1], "institutional traps" [2] and the sub-
sequent "poverty trap" [3]. Unproven transitional 
attempt has been succeeded by the less successful 
socialist problem-solving demonstration.
Many institutional deviations were reproduced 
under the decisive influence of monistic quasi-in-
stitutional economic policies of neoliberal type 
during the 25 years of transition, which took place 
from the initial institutional vacuum, through 
parallel formation of formal and alternative in-
stitutions to permanent institutional failures. It 
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turned out that the neo-liberal economic policies 
served the privileged "elite" as theoretical screen 
for achieving and preserving the non-market ac-
quiring the wealth and power.
In addition to the negative internal regional 
events (wars, disruption of economic coopera-
tion and its slow recovery, decline of economic in-
dicators, etc.) and external influences (global cri-
sis, imposition of the foreign patterns and condi-
tioned access to the wider variety of regional in-
tegration), it is likely that expansion and strong 
impact of alternative institutions 1 (in practice) and 
quasi-neo-liberal rhetoric (in theory) was crucial 
for anti-institutional characteristics of the social 
and economic realities in the SEE6 region. Apart 
from such external and internal negative factors, 
the dominant influence of multiplicative hinder-
ing mechanism, which prevented the desired eco-
nomic and social development. This mechanism 
is effectively demonstrated its influence through 
non-market distribution of character made the 
disastrous alternative institutions and quasi-neo-
liberalism as their ideological basis. It is therefore 
no exaggeration to claim that they represent the 
core of privileges (access to resources, their ap-
propriation of rapacious character, spreading the 
power and monopoly, blocking the massive free-
doms which were only propagated, violating the 
election promises, etc.), enabled by the political 
parties and coalitions in power. This has led to nu-
merous conflicts regarding methods of organizing 
the social, political and economic realities, and 
their interrelationship.
Generally speaking, all institutional indicators, 
institutional innovation and institutional changes 
are unsatisfactory. They are far behind the cor-
responding indicators in developed countries. 
Economic practice of the SEE6 region indicates ex-
treme crisis characteristics in a long run. Most au-
thors think that the main cause for the failure of 
previous "reforms" is deficit of real institutional 
change, i.e. conscious, programmed and inter-
est-oriented, disregarding the institutional factors 
of development and institutional pluralism as a 
civilizational imperative and development priority.
2. Theoretical approach
Many authors rightfully emphasize the sig-
nificance of coordination as the process of mu-
1 It comprises various socio-pathological creations, grey econ-
omy, endurance in the application of wrong monistic formulas 
of neoliberal „shock therapy“, compensating for the strictness 
of formal rules by their non-performance, corruption, attenua-
tion of property rights, formation of various behaviour stereo-
types, actuation of informal behaviours (spreading institutional 
conflicts) etc.
tual harmonization of certain economic institu-
tions of market regulations and state regulations. 
That way, they directly advocate the equality, in-
ter-conditionality and mutual effects of economic 
institutes as constituents of the mutual economic 
mechanism of coordination and regulation. 
Theory and practice show that: a) efficient so-
cial and economic institutions are conducive to 
economic development, and b) normal function-
ing of developed countries and economies, which 
are increasingly exposed to the crisis, is not pos-
sible without the active implementation of insti-
tutional pluralism. Furthermore, the institutional 
pluralism is understood as a combination of:
— state and market regulation (in the eco-
nomic level)
— political democracy, the rule of law, social 
and cultural capital, and other social subsystems 
(in the social level), and
— formal and informal institutions, their bal-
anced action and dominance and control over all 
forms of alternative institutions.
Institutional rules of conduct in the western 
(and other developed) economic systems have 
been established in an evolutionary way, as a re-
sult of their consistent application and centuries 
of development (economic, industrial, financial, 
political, trade, social, cultural, organizational, 
corporate and other). In transition economies of 
the SEE6 region, institutional changes are rela-
tively recent. Nevertheless, three arguments con-
firm deliberate blocking of institutional changes 
by the nomenclature in power and their lobbyists: 
First, two and a half decades was a long period, 
enough to raise awareness of their importance and 
their actual implementation in practice; Second, 
there were undisputed and numerous exemplary 
models in developed countries; and Third, a large 
number of theoretical papers was published in the 
region and beyond, clearly indicating the impera-
tive of real institutional changes and institutional 
pluralism.
Many theoretical studies of foreign authors 
from the West (D. North, A. Denzau, J. Wallis, 
B. Weingast, J. Stiglitz, D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, 
J. Robinson, J. Hirshleifer, G. Calabresi, D. Harvey, 
N. Klein, G. Kolodko, D. Rodrik et al.), and from 
Russia (V. Polterovič, E. Popov, B. Yerznkyan, et 
al.), as well as authors from the SEE6 region, broad-
ened with the authors from Croatia and Slovenia 
(V. Draskovic, D. Stoyanov, M. Mesarić, G. Santini, 
Z. Baletić, D. Cvijeticanin, M. Sekulović, M. Jaksic, 
J. Mencinger, S. Kulic, J. Dusanic, M. Kovacevic, 
A . Cakardic, M. Draskovic, R. Jovovic et al.) have 
confirmed the absolute dominance of conceptual 
understanding of the following:
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— positive impact of realistically-developed so-
cial and economic institutional framework (formal 
and informal) on economic development, despite 
the destructive impact of alternative institutions;
— economic development requires a pluralistic 
(combined, synergistic, integral) action of formal 
and informal, economic and social institutions, 
while their monistic (selective, exclusive and in-
terest-oriented) action contradicts all the devel-
opment and civilized norms and models;
— economic development assumes that all the 
people (massiveness!) under equal and fair condi-
tions are allowed a realistic approach of individ-
ualistic, liberal and market values and economic 
resources, not only systematically privileged indi-
viduals. This criterion clearly differentiates rhet-
oric from practice, neo-liberal from quasi-neolib-
eral model, virtual from real, promises from ac-
tual manifestation, freedom for the rare (privi-
leged "elitist" minority) from quasi-institutional 
violence against the underprivileged and looted 
mass,
— criticism of unscientific and consistent jus-
tification of neoliberal ("reformed") application, 
economic policy ("pathology of the neoliberal 
model" [4, p. 12], for which was clearly converted 
through vulgarization of the theoretical model 
into a dogmatic and apologetic quasi-neoliber-
alism and the corresponding anti-institutional 
practical solutions, which have become one of the 
major causes of catastrophic economic results in 
the SEE6 region, and led to long-term reproduc-
tion of social and economic crisis; and
— proving that some institutions (primarily 
state regulation) have been abused and turned 
into a cover for their unlimited circumvention, in-
terest and rent orientated behavior and enrich-
ment of the ruling nomenclature. This is possible 
only in conditions of (almost) total domination of 
politics over economics, which eliminates the in-
stitutional competition.
In the period of monitoring of the SEE6 region, 
there was a classic and drastic substitution of for-
mal and informal institutions by alternative in-
stitutions, institutional pluralism by quasi-insti-
tutional monism of alleged neo-liberal type and 
mass individualism by the privileged few indi-
viduals, who have enriched themselves at some 
of the non-market ways. V. Draskovic [5, p. 289] 
has modeled his research starting from the logi-
cal assumption that the total profit of privileged 
individuals is equal to the total loss of the nation. 
From this assumptions, he has performed a simple 
(approximate) formula, according to which 
Bd + Fi + G = Woe; 
Bd stands for the brain drain, Fi is foreign in-
vestments, G is grey economy and Woe stands for 
the wealth of elites. He has pointed out that de-
tails of the formula presented above are equal to 
particular items that present the total of the pri-
vatized assets (mainly snatched). The wealth could 
be indicated only as a small percentage, because 
majority of it lies in the estates. This leads us to 
the conclusion that privatized goods have not 
been properly invested. There are no jobs because 
there was no investing, and there was no invest-
ing because of the lack of the capital. The capital 
was held in the different funds, reserves and be-
longings. Direct foreign investments ended up as 
short-term developing solution, being transferred 
through various channels with mistrust. The total 
societal disfigures and minimal welfare to able in-
dividuals was absorbed within climate of unequal 
availability to resources.
All this have happened under the wing of so 
often criticized but misused state (with stories 
about "minimal state") and through absolutiza-
tion of the market (which was very cramped, dis-
torted and monopolized). This historical paradox 
has enabled mass deception of the people in the 
observed region (as well as a much wider area), 
which was functionally subordinated to the inter-
est motives of alibi-reformers.
In theory, there are discussions on border is-
sues and scope of some economic institutions 
(state and market regulation), their social and 
economic orientation and engagement, and 
those discourses define the institutional balance 
and metaphorical-analytical term "institutional 
man" as a synonym of limited economic rational-
ity. However, in order to have the title of consist-
ency and scientific basis, these discussions must 
not question the widely accepted rational recom-
mendations of neo-institutional economic theo-
ries, and especially those related to the impera-
tiveness of institutional pluralism, which is abso-
lutely proven in developed countries and regions.
3. Ignoring institutional pluralism
In theory and practice, the concept of insti-
tutional pluralism is contrary to neo-liberal con-
cept of quasi-institutional monism, which directly 
supports the substitution of mass individualism 
by individualism of the few (the privileged "elite").
In all neo-institutional and new-institutional 
economic theories, although based on neoclas-
sical methodological individualism, the applica-
tion of institutional pluralism in economic devel-
opment is directly suggested by its many inter-
pretations of public choice, property rights, op-
timal contract, etc. Thus, for example, A. Denzau 
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and D. North [6, p. 20] have insisted on "co-evo-
lutionary process" as an ideology and institu-
tions, emphasizing that complementarity and 
synergy of institutions for market and state reg-
ulation have no rational alternative. Three dec-
ades ago, D. North [7, p. 32] used the term "insti-
tutional structure" as a synonym for pluralism of 
institutions, referring primarily to the "structure 
of property rights to achieve the maximization 
of income (social welfare — author’s note) and a 
high level of freedom" (through the minimization 
of costs for specification and protection of owner-
ship rights — author’s note). G. Hodgson [8, p. 8] 
has also stated that need for institutional syner-
gies as a "bridge between the two levels of anal-
ysis," which is reflected in the encounter approx-
imation "from the macroeconomic top to the mi-
croeconomic bottom."
Three decades ago D. North [7, p 32] wrote 
about the importance of institutional pluralism 
in the following way, “The dominant goal of the 
capitalist state is the construction of such institu-
tional structures, especially the structure of own-
ership rights, using which it achieves maximiza-
tion of income (social welfare-remark by the au-
thor) and a high degree of freedom” (through min-
imization of costs for specification and protection 
of property rights — remark by authors). 
None of this has been achieved in the SEE6 re-
gion! The causes and consequences of ignoring 
the institutional pluralism are listed in Table 1.
Table 1 indicates that negative impacts were 
numerous. They acted cumulatively and directly 
contributed to the creation of many deficits and 
surpluses in key social and economic areas where 
they should not be existing.
4. The action of anti-institutional factors
The failure of transition in the SEE6 countries 
is undoubtedly the result of applying the “reform” 
politics with double standards. Under the rhe-
torical neo-liberal mask of the market, competi-
tion, entrepreneurship and freedom, the politics 
and strategy of “reformers” were oriented toward 
non-market process, motivated strictly by indi-
vidual interests, instead of propagated social and 
economic results.
Significant for this study is to identify the an-
ti-institutional factors that actively participate in 
society and economic reality of the SEE6 region. 
In other words, it is important to answer this ques-
tion: What, who and why interferes with real insti-
tutional changes, and formation and development 
of effective institutions? The accurate answer is 
this: Real institutional changes are blocked due to:
a) interest formation and long-term domi-
nance of alternative institutions, and
b) degradation of the freedom of individuals on 
a mass scale, which should provide a competitive 
decentralized political environment.
The effects of the alternative institutes system 
were especially visible in numerous examples of 
the rapacious privatization, which has not been 
completed yet in most of the SEE6 countries.
The mass phenomenon of accessing the re-
sources, personal and economic freedom, em-
ployment, and motivation, legal institutions (for-
mal and informal) and to their pluralistic activ-
ity in the SEE6 region have been fragmentary and 
episodic, rather than universal and compulsory 
(Fig. 2 — shaded area).
The monograph "Violence and Social Orders — 
A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded 
Human History" [9] studies the ways to limit vio-
lence in society (especially violence over the mas-
siveness — author’s note), for which the authors 
reasonably consider to be the main anti-institu-
tional factor. Discussing the basic conclusions 
of this study, V. Draskovic and M. Delibasic [10, 
pp. 44-45] have pointed out the following: On the 
Table 1 
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other hand, it promoted further growth. According 
to North, Walis and Weingast, ferocity stands for 
different forms of sociopath ology: the off-market 
dedication of rents, corrupting the voters, taking 
advantage of privileged position, conflict of in-
terests, ignoring the needs of the voters, etc. The 
mentioned authors demonstrate the possibility of 
gerrymandering in order to manipulate economy 
and build “old-boy” networking that exists sepa-
rately from institutions, excused from any politi-
cal and economic rivalry. 
This input of neoliberal doctrine in the coun-
tries with such exclusive privileges was putting the 
elites in the favourable position for the rent col-
lection. Such rights were coming out of the lack of 
institutional structure with a notion of nepotism 
and mastering the string pulling. In such constel-
lation, without strict following particular written 
rules and regulations, politics takes charge of the 
economy, elites manipulate the population, and 
semi-existing institutions identified with lead-
ers are abundant. The authors above focus on the 
restricted areas bolstered by the weak legislative 
and judicial foundations, lack of freedom guaran-
tees and extinguished competition in the society. 
Pyramidal hierarchy is determined by the individ-
uals’ position in the society. The hierarchical sys-
tem of society infrastructure totally decreases the 
civic productivity. On the contrary, bribery phe-
nomenon becomes an every-day business stand-
ard in relationship with clients. It’s overwhelming 
because it lacks the options to eliminate already 
formed malign institutional structure.
All analyzes of economic effects of transition 
of the SEE countries, and forced liberalization, and 
"rapacious" privatization, clearly show a "transfor-
mational recession" [11] from 1991 to 1995, and 
then criminalization and collapse of economy in 
the period of so-called "prolonged transition" from 
1995 to 2015. Overall, this has led to a number of 
negative externalities, deepening and reproduc-
ing the economy and general social crisis. Practice 
has shown that formal institutional "reforms" in 
the SEE6 countries did not adapt to the strategies 
"evolution of social institutions" [12] and "trans-
plant institutions" [13, 14].
The causes were social, political and interest. 
They have enabled adjustment, forcing and re-
production of institutional dysfunctionality (pa-
ternalism, nepotism, passivity, tradition of vi-
olating the legal norms, possibilities of unpun-
ished manipulation, abuse and compensation, log 
rolling, lobbying, rent orientated behavior, etc.). 
Therefore, there has been a parallel disruption 
and erosion of public interest and strengthening 
of the interest and power of the ruling "elite".
In the SEE6 region, political decisions have had 
a significant impact on redistribution and alloca-
tion of resources, which led to the criminalization 
of the economy and negative economic results.
Indisputably, the SEE countries have also seen 
some positive systemic changes 1 and institutional 
1 Many positive institutional changes cannot be negated, nor the 
truth that they are significantly neutralized by negative and hin-
dering actions. Seemingly the worst of all is lacking the nec-
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Fig. 2. The brake mechanism of alternative institutions
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transformations. However, formed and rooted al-
ternative institutions (in shadow) have been dom-
inating in practice over the formal and infor-
mal institutions. The great influence of interest 
groups, which were rent-oriented, quasi-market 
and preferential in accessing the resources was 
achieved through alternative institutions. They 
have formed the recombinant institutional order, 
where structured government have determined 
and dosed the level, quality and speed of institu-
tional changes, giving priority to their own nar-
row, lobbying interests in relation to general so-
cial interests. In this way, the massiveness, sub-
stituted by the privileged individualism, filed un-
der the quasi-neoliberal rhetoric was propagated, 
which in essence was institutionally monistic. 
This has led to numerous contradictions, miscon-
ceptions, dilemmas, mistakes and problems, which 
resulted in poor economic performance (Table 2).
In the period from 1989 to 2009, the SEE re-
gion had an annual GDP growth rate of only 0.5 %, 
while some countries had a negative growth rate: 
-2.9 % Serbia, Montenegro -1.1 %, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina -0.1 % [15 , p. 15] In the period 
from 2009 to 2013, real GDP growth was 13.9 % 
in Albania, 6.9 % in FYR of Macedonia, 0.7 % 
in Montenegro, -0.5 % in Serbia, and -1.2 % in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina [16]. Fig. 3 shows a large 
drop in GDP at the beginning of the global eco-
nomic crisis, which had an extremely negative im-
pact on the SEE6 region. The fall in economic ac-
tivity directly influenced the rapid growth of un-
employment, reaching a large scale, and average 
for SEE6 was 24.5 %, which was two times higher 
than in the EU. Unemployment was above average 
in Kosovo (43.5 %), in FYR of Macedonia (31 %) 
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (27.5 %).
In the same period, public debt has increased 
significantly in the SEE region, and in some coun-
tries is even doubled. Thus, for example: in Serbia 
is increased from 29.2 % to 59.6 % of GDP, and in 
Montenegro from 28.7 % to 59.6 % [http://www.
javnidug.gov.rs; http://www.indexmundi.com; 
http://www.cb-mn.org]. With economic crisis in 
Europe 2008, all the SEE countries had problems 
with public finances, there was a drop or stagna-
tion of GDP, which was supposed to finance in-
creased government spending. The scissors of 
lower GDP and higher government expenditures 
were occurred. To compensate for funds lacking 
in their budgets, these countries kept borrowing 
funds. Thus, after 2008, public debt began to grow 
much faster than GDP, and after a while it created 
essary institutional synergism and mass propagated property 
changes.
the debt problem. Data for Montenegro and Serbia 
are shown in fig. 4.
In addition to these economic trends, unfa-
vorable is also the average inflation rate of 6.7 %, 
which is three times higher than in the EU (2.3 %). 
Particularly high is the rate of food inflation (9.3 %). 
World Bank estimates that 33 % of the population in 
the SEE6 region lives in poverty, and 8 % lives in the 
extreme poverty. Economic recession was followed 
by the consequent increase of poverty and inequal-
ity. Poverty is associated with unemployment, and 
therefore it is the largest in Kosovo (80 %), Albania 
(60 %) and FYR of Macedonia (41 %). Expanding of 
inequality has begun immediately after the start 
of the post-socialist transition, after the first "ra-
pacious" privatizations and it has been continu-
ous since. Huge gap between mass poverty and ac-
cumulated wealth is the result of unequal access to 
resources, party distribution of the privilege, mo-
nopoly distribution of property rights, and deficit 
of the competition at all levels.
Apart from the problems with sustainabil-
ity of public finances, negative impact to the eco-
nomic growth has been present in economy over-
all and lack of competitiveness of enterprises, as 
well as numerous structural barriers and dispro-
portions. Economic problems have existed in an 
environment of disturbed social value systems. 
Table 2
Selected economic indicators for the SEE6 region in 2013 
(Annual percentage change)
Real GDP weighted average 2,5
GDP compared to the EU average 25
Unemployment 15–31 %
Current Account Balance /–1,8/ — /–15/
Consumer prices 1,9–7,7
Average Wage 330–480
The share of public debt with guarantees 
in GDP 41–70
FDI (US$ per capita) 77–869 
Rang Growth Competitiveness Index 67–101
Source: National statistical offices and World Bank.
Fig. 3. GDP growth rate, and unemployment rate for the region 
SEE6 (2007–2013)
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Party membership, authority, eligibility and be-
lief were forced at the expense of profession, cre-
ativity, knowledge and science. Negative selection 
of personnel, criminalization of economy, corrup-
tion and a range of socio-pathological phenom-
ena were flourished. There has been an impover-
ishment of the people and the enormous enrich-
ment of the minority, which led to the destruction 
of the middle class, concentration of the political 
and economic power and continuation of authori-
tarian traditions.
Post-socialist transition in the SEE6 countries 
was conducted as a velvet revolution and as a re-
sponse to the socialistic tyranny (the party, goals, 
slogans, promises). However, the recombination of 
old and new form of tyranny was being enforced. 
New and larger problems have occurred, as well 
as contradictions, crisis, poverty, disintegration 
and uncertainty. Socialist vices were transformed 
into even worse and heavier — post socialistic. 
Transition dogmas were formed, replacing the so-
cialist. Economy institutions have been replaced 
by pseudo-forms (imitation and improvisation).
The use of apparatus of force and charismat-
ics of “strong men in politics” has paradoxically 
subordinated the economic policy for the realiza-
tion of private and party interests [18]. It repre-
sented the main obstacle to institutional changes, 
in addition to the prominent sociopath logical mi-
lieu. It all resulted in a long-term destabilisation 
of economic systems in SEE6 region.
The dominance of the political (party) interest 
has functionally determined all economic and so-
cial institutions, especially in the redistribution 
of property rights. Implemented in this way was 
the control and monopolization of all important 
economic processes, economic policy and ma-
jor events in the economic reality. Supremacy of 
"alternative" informal rules of conduct over for-
mal and informal institutions [19] was forced. 
This process was carried out with high interest 
sign. "Economic imperialism" was metaphorically 
copy-pasted from the neo-institutional theory to 
the post-socialist practice of the SEE6 region. This 
contradicts numerous studies [20] which presents 
institutional restructuring for economic evolu-
tion over the longer period of time, being the most 
supportive economic resurgence in the long run. 
5. Conclusion
Reduced activity of formal and informal institu-
tions, and their substitution by strong alternative 
institutions was and still is the bottleneck of eco-
nomic development in the SEE6 region. Therefore, 
it is necessary to increase efforts in building and 
developing the consistent and pluralistic institu-
tional (regulatory) model. In this sense, it is par-
ticularly important to explore practical exemplary 
model, the experience of which in certain seg-
ments can be successfully used and combined with 
its own specificities.
All "development" models that ignore institu-
tions are unsustainable. Instead of forming and 
developing the effective institutions, transition 
countries in the SEE6 region were dominated by 
various forms of alternative institutions. They 
were the main generator of creating inefficient, 
imitation-interest and dysfunctional (vertical) in-
stitutional order.
In theoretical and practical sense, institu-
tional pluralism is imposed as a basic principle of 
the civilizational development. Only institutional 
pluralism can successfully resolve, regulate, stim-
ulate and limit the contradictions between gen-
eral and private interests.
The analysis in this paper has confirmed the 
initial hypothesis. It has clearly showed that defi-
cit of institutional pluralism and real functioning 
of formal institutions in the SEE6 region is con-
ditioned by their subordination to the alternative 
institutions. This has ultimately led to deforma-
tion, reduction and asymmetry of information, so 
the economic choices have become subjective and 
determined by preferential access to resources. 
Transaction costs were constantly growing. All 
this resulted in the creation of a strong anti-insti-
tutional hindering mechanism, which contributed 
significantly to the formation of a long-term and 
inertial reproduction of crisis and many develop-
ment barriers.
Fig. 4. GDP Growth rate, and Public Debt for the Montenegro and Serbia (%)
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